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It was always recognition that one thing that conspicuously 
distinguishes women from men is that only women become 
pregnant; and if you subject a woman to disadvantageous treatment 
on the basis of her pregnant status, which was what was happening 
to Captain Struck, you would be denying her equal treatment under 
the law.1 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an attempt at recovery. This Essay hopes to call attention 
to then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 1972 merits brief2 in Struck 
v. Secretary of Defense.3 The brief has been underappreciated in part 
because the Supreme Court of the United States eventually declined 
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 1. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 206 (1993) (statement 
of Judge Ginsburg) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearings]. 
 2. See Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178), 
1972 WL 135840. Melvin Wulf, Joel Gora, Brenda Feigen Fasteau, and Robert Czeisler also 
signed the brief. Melvin Wulf was the Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU). Joel Gora was an ACLU attorney who worked on the case. Brenda Feigen (no longer 
Fasteau) was a cofounder of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project. Robert Czeisler was the 
attorney, affiliated with the ACLU in the state of Washington, who represented Captain Struck 
in the district court and the Ninth Circuit. His valiant lawyering kept Captain Struck in the Air 
Force and fighting to remain there, not discharged, as the government would have preferred. It 
is evident that Ginsburg’s distinctive voice pervades the brief. 
 3. Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). 
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to decide the case.4 But anyone seeking to understand the origins and 
nature of Justice Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination would be 
well advised to read this brief. So would anyone interested in 
reimagining the bounds of constitutional possibility in the realm of 
gender equality. 
In her capacity as general counsel for the Women’s Rights 
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, Ginsburg filed the 
Struck brief a little more than a year after the Court decided Reed v. 
Reed,5 but before the Court began to give shape to liberty and 
equality doctrine concerning the regulation of pregnant women in 
cases such as Roe v. Wade,6 Frontiero v. Richardson,7 and Geduldig v. 
Aiello.8 Ginsburg wrote the brief on behalf of an Air Force officer, 
Captain Susan Struck, whose pregnancy—and whose refusal on 
 
 4. See id. at 1071 (vacating and remanding for consideration of mootness in light of the 
government’s change in position). 
 5. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause 
an Idaho law that gave automatic preference to men over women as administrators of estates. 
Id. at 77. Reed was handed down on November 22, 1971. The Struck brief was filed on 
December 4, 1972. 
 6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court decided Roe on January 22, 1973, less 
than two months after Ginsburg filed the Struck brief. 
 7. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Frontiero invalidated under the Equal 
Protection Clause a federal statute providing that spouses of male members of the military are 
dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental 
benefits, but that spouses of female members are not dependents unless they are in fact 
dependent for more than one-half of their support. Id. at 692 (plurality opinion). 
 8. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig upheld against an equal protection 
challenge a California law that provided workers comprehensive disability insurance for all 
temporarily disabling conditions that might prevent them from working, except pregnancy, on 
the ground that pregnancy discrimination was not necessarily sex discrimination. Id. at 496–97. 
Although laws burdening pregnant employees harm only female employees, the Court stressed 
that they potentially benefit a group that includes employees of both sexes. See id. at 497 n.20 
(“The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance 
program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential 
recipients into two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is 
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits 
of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.”). The Court subsequently tried to apply 
Geduldig’s reasoning to federal employment discrimination law in General Electric Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Gilbert held that a disability benefit plan excluding disabilities 
related to pregnancy was not sex-based discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e to e-17 (2006). Id. at 145–46. Congress responded by 
enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII (PDA), which defines 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex. See Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
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religious grounds to have an abortion9—subjected her to automatic 
discharge from military service.10 
The brief demonstrates that, from the very beginning, Justice 
Ginsburg has conceived discrimination against pregnant women as a 
core case of sex discrimination. In 1972, Ginsburg understood 
pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination because she has long 
viewed laws enforcing sex roles of the separate spheres tradition as 
compromising the “equal citizenship stature” of women.11 
In Struck, Ginsburg argued that excluding a pregnant woman 
from the Air Force when men otherwise similarly situated in their 
capacity or incapacity to work are provided sick leave is a core case of 
sex discrimination because the distinction “reflects arbitrary notions 
of woman’s place wholly at odds with contemporary legislative and 
judicial recognition that individual potential must not be restrained, 
nor equal opportunity limited, by law-sanctioned stereotypical 
prejudgments.”12 The brief opened by emphasizing that laws imposing 
traditional sex roles on pregnant women deny individuals equal 
opportunity and perpetuate the secondary social status of women: 
Heading the list of arbitrary barriers that have plagued women 
seeking equal opportunity is disadvantaged treatment based on their 
unique childbearing function. Until very recent years, jurists have 
regarded any discrimination in the treatment of pregnant women 
and mothers as “benignly in their favor.” But in fact, restrictive 
rules, and particularly discharge for pregnancy rules, operate as 
“built-in headwinds” that drastically curtail women’s opportunities. 
Decisions of this Court that span a century have contributed to this 
anomaly: presumably well-meaning exaltation of woman’s unique 
 
 9. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
 10. Id. at 4. 
 11. Justice Ginsburg has used this or similar language in a variety of settings, both on and 
off the Court. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to 
vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to 
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”); United States v. 
Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly recognized that neither 
federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or 
official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature—equal 
opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual 
talents and capacities.”). See generally Neil S. Siegel, Equal Citizenship Stature: Justice 
Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision in President Obama’s America, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
(forthcoming December 2009) (participating in a symposium honoring the jurisprudence of 
Justice Ginsburg). 
 12. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 7. 
SIEGEL & SIEGEL IN FINAL 12/1/2009 6:13:23 PM 
774 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:771 
role in bearing children has, in effect, restrained women from 
developing their individual talents and capacities and has impelled 
them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society.13 
Ginsburg thus argued that traditions of regulating women during 
pregnancy are not in fact benign but instead play a key role in 
imposing on women “subordinate” social status. 
As this Essay shows, Ginsburg’s equal protection argument in 
Struck anticipates views that she would subsequently express on the 
bench14—including her account of intermediate scrutiny for the Court 
in United States v. Virginia,15 which requires the judiciary closely to 
examine laws that classify on the basis of sex but allows government 
to differentiate between men and women so long as “such 
classifications [are] not . . . used, as they once were, to create or 
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”16 
The Struck brief illustrates beautifully how Ginsburg reasons from 
antisubordination values in defining constitutional equality, in 
identifying the perspective from which to determine whether equality 
values are implicated, and in linking equality- and liberty-based 
arguments for the full participation of women in the public and 
private life of the nation. 
Ginsburg’s understanding of pregnancy discrimination in Struck 
calls into question certain feminist characterizations of her as a 
 
 13. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 
8, 19 (D. Conn. 1968); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). 
 14. For one account of Ginsburg’s legal strategy, see Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of 
Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the Law, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 73 (1989). For 
examples of other feminist lawyers of the era who challenged pregnancy discrimination as sex 
discrimination, see Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1385–86 (2006). 
“In constitutional and Title VII litigation in the early 1970s, feminist lawyers including Ruth 
Ginsburg, Wendy Williams, and Susan Deller Ross . . . argu[ed] that regulations pertaining to 
pregnant women were sex-based, subject to heightened scrutiny, and wrongful when they 
enforced stereotypical understandings of women’s roles.” Id. Wendy Williams wrote the 
petitioner’s brief in Geduldig, and Susan Deller Ross was pivotal “in providing arguments to the 
EEOC that the Equal Protection Clause reached pregnancy discrimination.” Id. at 1385 n.169. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Susan Deller Ross coauthored a 1977 op-ed responding to Geduldig. 
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Susan Deller Ross, Pregnancy and Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 1977, at A33 (“The Supreme Court decision was a stunning rejection of the position that 
had been taken by the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and six Federal 
courts of appeals. These authorities had identified discrimination against the pregnant worker as 
the essence of sex discrimination.”). 
 15. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 16. Id. at 534 (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)). 
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proponent of formal equality—a criticism that has been advanced by 
those who viewed Ginsburg’s repeated representation of male 
plaintiffs in the early sex discrimination cases as narrowly reflecting a 
concern with arbitrary sex-based classification only.17 Ginsburg 
argued that laws differentiating on the basis of sex are 
unconstitutional when they enforce traditional sex stereotypes 
because such laws wrongfully restrict individual opportunity and 
contribute to the subordinate status of women. Ginsburg was able to 
perceive social subordination in the exclusion of a pregnant woman 
from military service, even though pregnancy had long been 
understood as the principal physical difference between the sexes, 
because she saw that government regulation was enforcing traditional 
sex stereotypes.18 Ginsburg saw clearly. 
As interesting and consequential as Ginsburg’s own views have 
been, recovery of the Struck brief is even more important for what it 
illuminates about the present. In the immediate aftermath of Struck, 
the Court acknowledged that pregnancy discrimination might be an 
invidious expression of sex discrimination but did not seriously 
consider the account that Ginsburg and other feminist litigators 
offered of how laws discriminating against pregnant women could 
enforce traditional sex stereotypes and so deny women the equal 
protection of the laws.19 Nor did the Court scrutinize the relationship 
to which the Struck brief pointed—between cases protecting women’s 
right to equal protection and protecting their autonomy in deciding 
whether to bear children.20 Decades later, however, through a series 
of incremental changes that have not yet been fully recognized,21 the 
Court has begun to reason from something like Ginsburg’s position 
 
 17. See, e.g., Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Limits of 
Formal Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 216, 231 
(Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); see also infra note 84 and accompanying text. See infra Part III for a 
discussion of substantive (that is, antisubordination) versus formal (that is, anticlassification) 
views of equality. 
 18. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
 19. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974) (“Absent a showing that 
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination 
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or 
exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as 
with respect to any other physical condition.”). On feminist arguments of the era, see supra note 
14. 
 20. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 10. 
 21. See infra Part IV (discussing changes manifest in decades of PDA litigation, Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
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without quite embracing it. The final chapter in this domain of 
constitutional law has yet to be written. 
Part I recounts the facts of Struck. Part II details the arguments 
Ginsburg made in her merits brief in the case. Part III explores what 
Struck suggests about Ginsburg’s views on constitutional equality. 
Part IV shows that although the Court did not initially embrace the 
understanding of pregnancy discrimination that Ginsburg expressed 
in Struck, over time the Court has begun to internalize the feminist 
movement’s concerns about the stereotyping pregnant women face, 
incorporating these concerns into equal protection and due process 
doctrines regarding the regulation of pregnant women. 
I.  THE FACTS OF STRUCK 
The facts of Struck v. Secretary of Defense were straightforward.22 
Captain Susan Struck was a career officer in the United States Air 
Force who served as a nurse in the Vietnam War.23 In 1970, she 
became pregnant.24 She was ordered to an Air Force base in the state 
of Washington, where a disposition board hearing was held.25 She 
declared her intent to give the child up for adoption as soon as she 
gave birth, and she stated that her accrued leave time of sixty days 
was more than sufficient to cover the temporary period of disability 
that she anticipated at the time of childbirth.26 The Air Force, 
however, pursuant to a regulation then in effect, gave her this choice: 
have an abortion on the base or leave the Service.27 Because Captain 
 
 22. This Essay takes the facts from the Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 3–7. Justice 
Ginsburg has recounted the story of Struck on more than one occasion. See Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Remarks for the Celebration of 75 Years of Women’s Enrollment at Columbia Law 
School, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (2002); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial 
Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1200–02 (1992) (Madison Lecture delivered in March 1993); 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Advocating the Elimination 
of Gender-Based Discrimination: The 1970s New Look at the Equality Principle, Address at the 
University of Cape Town, South Africa (Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Advocating], 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-10-06.html. She also 
discussed Struck at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing. See, e.g., Ginsburg Hearings, supra 
note 1, at 205–06; see also infra Part II. 
 23. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 3–4. 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. See id. The regulation stated: 
The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the least practical 
delay when it is determined that one of the conditions in a or b below exist . . . 
a. Pregnancy: 
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Struck was a practicing Roman Catholic, abortion was not an option 
for her.28 But neither did she quietly accept the termination of her 
chosen career.29 She instead sued to fend off the discharge, securing 
able representation from lawyers for the American Civil Liberties 
Union in Washington. 
Captain Struck was able to obtain a stay of her discharge each 
month, but she lost on the merits both in the district court and in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.30 In the view of 
those courts, it was constitutionally irrelevant that no other physical 
condition occasioning a temporary period of disability—whether a 
broken leg or drug and alcohol abuse (which might not be 
temporary)—resulted in mandatory discharge regardless of individual 
circumstances.31 Nor did it matter that a male officer who participated 
in conceiving a child was free—indeed, encouraged—to continue his 
service career as a parent.32 
The Supreme Court agreed to entertain Captain Struck’s claims 
to constitutional attention. Ginsburg scored the Air Force regulation 
at bar as a violation of (1) equal protection, (2) Captain Struck’s right 
to privacy in the conduct of her personal life, and (3) her free exercise 
of religion.33 Solicitor General Erwin Griswold was apparently 
 
(1) General: 
(a) A woman will be discharged from the service with the least practical delay when a 
determination is made by a medical officer that she is pregnant. 
. . . 
b. Minor Children: 
(1) General. The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the least 
practical delay when it is established that she: 
. . . 
(d) Has given birth to a living child while in a commissioned officer status. 
Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Air Force Regulation 36-
12). A 1971 amendment to the regulation provided that “Discharge Action will be cancelled if 
Pregnancy is Terminated.” Id. at 1376 (quoting Part I.C of 1971 Amendments to Regulations). 
 28. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 56. 
 29. See id. at 4. 
 30. Struck, 460 F.2d at 1374, 1377. 
 31. “[Captain] Struck’s problem,” Ginsburg fought the temptation to state in opening the 
brief, was that she “picked the wrong form of recreation in Vietnam.” See Markowitz, supra 
note 14, at 81 n.100 (quoting oral statement by Ginsburg). Ginsburg held her tongue, id. at 81, 
presumably because she was concerned about turning off the audience. 
 32. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 55 (“[P]arenthood among servicemen 
is not deterred, indeed additional benefits are provided to encourage men who become fathers 
to remain in service.” (citations omitted)). 
 33. See infra Part II. 
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concerned about the government’s chances before the Court. “He 
recommended that the Air Force waive Captain Struck’s discharge 
and abandon its policy of automatically discharging women for 
pregnancy.”34 The Air Force agreed, and General Griswold moved to 
dismiss the case as moot.35 
The Supreme Court never heard oral argument. It elected to 
vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit “to 
consider the issue of mootness in light of the position presently 
asserted by the Government.”36 
II.  GINSBURG’S ARGUMENTS IN STRUCK 
Ginsburg’s Struck brief has been neglected37 not only because the 
Court did not decide the merits of the case, but also because, shortly 
thereafter, the Justices rejected an equal protection challenge to a 
pregnancy discrimination claim.38 This neglect is unfortunate. Among 
its other virtues, the Struck brief clarifies Justice Ginsburg’s approach 
to sex discrimination. Recalling Captain Susan Struck’s story during 
her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, then-Judge Ginsburg 
sought “to explain how [her] own thinking developed on [the] issue” 
of sex discrimination, and she identified “a case involving a woman’s 
choice for birth rather than the termination of her pregnancy.”39 “The 
 
 34. Ginsburg, Advocating, supra note 22. The authors have not been able to determine 
why Griswold feared a Supreme Court decision on the merits in Struck. They strongly suspect, 
however, that he perceived governmental coercion of abortion as an inadvisable context in 
which to vindicate the federal government’s asserted interests in the area of pregnancy 
discrimination. The context of Struck was very much one of coercion. See, e.g., Janice Goodman, 
Rhonda Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe, Where Do We Go from Here?, 1 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 20, 35 (1974) (discussing Struck as a case arising “[i]n the area of 
coercion”). 
 35. Memorandum Suggesting Mootness, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 
72-178). For Ginsburg’s response to the motion, see Opposition to Memorandum for the 
Respondents Suggesting Mootness, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72-178). 
 36. Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071. 
 37. Reva B. Siegel, Comments, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE 
NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL OPINION 244, 
245 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). For another account of Struck, see Siegel, supra note 14, at 1385 
& n.169. 
 38. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause permitted California to exclude from its disability insurance program the risk of 
disability resulting from normal pregnancy). 
 39. Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 1, at 205. 
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Struck brief,” she recalled, “marks the time when I first thought long 
and hard about this question.”40 
In the brief, Ginsburg argued that government regulation of 
pregnant women was presumptively unconstitutional when such 
regulation enforced the sex roles and stereotypes of the separate 
spheres tradition—the dyadic structuring of sex roles in which men 
are expected to perform as breadwinners and women are expected to 
perform as economically dependent caregivers. Ginsburg portrayed 
the plaintiff’s discharge for pregnancy as perpetuating this tradition: 
  The central question raised in this case is whether the Air Force, 
consistent with the equal protection principle inherent in the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment, may call for immediate 
discharge of pregnant women officers (whether detection of 
pregnancy occurs at 8 days or 8 months), unless pregnancy 
terminates soon after detection, while granting sick leave for all 
other physical conditions occasioning a period of temporary 
disability. It is petitioner’s position that this distinction reflects 
arbitrary notions of woman’s place wholly at odds with contemporary 
legislative and judicial recognition that individual potential must not 
be restrained, nor equal opportunity limited, by law-sanctioned 
stereotypical prejudgments. Captain Struck seeks no favors or special 
protection. She simply asks to be judged on the basis of her 
individual capacities and qualifications, and not on the basis of 
characteristics assumed to typify pregnant women.41 
As Ginsburg presented it, the government’s discrimination 
against pregnant officers was a paradigmatic case of the sex-role 
restrictions that subordinated women. Because it viewed pregnant 
officers through traditional sex stereotypes, the government excluded 
all pregnant women from employment, rather than tying eligibility to 
serve to capacity to work.42 The very case at bar illustrated that “many 
women are capable of working effectively during pregnancy and 
require only a brief period of absence immediately before and after 
childbirth.”43 But the government did not make such an individualized 
determination. Instead, it barred all pregnant women from serving, 
putatively to protect them.44 Regulations that purport to protect 
 
 40. Id. at 206. 
 41. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 20. 
 43. Id. at 35. 
 44. Id. at 20. 
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pregnant women by forcing them to stop working, the Struck brief 
sharply observed, “have in practice deprived working women of the 
protection they most need: protection of their right to work to 
support themselves and, in many cases, their families as well.”45 Thus, 
“mandatory pregnancy discharge reinforces societal pressure to 
relinquish career aspirations for a hearth-centered existence.”46 
The sex role stereotyping that the Air Force regulation enforced 
was perhaps most visible in its sex-differentiated approach to 
parenting. The regulation had defined the terms of service in such a 
way as to force a choice between employment and parenthood—for 
women only.47 Fathers were allowed to serve in the Air Force while 
mothers were not: Although “men in the Air Force are not 
constrained to avoid the pleasures and responsibilities of procreation 
and parenthood,”48 Captain Struck “was presumed unfit for service 
under a regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits 
into the stereotyped vision . . . of the ‘correct’ female response to 
pregnancy.”49 
The pregnancy regulation challenged in Struck assessed pregnant 
women’s employment qualifications as a group rather than as 
individuals, and it prohibited the employment of officers who became 
mothers, while allowing the employment of officers who became 
fathers. The regulation’s prescriptive assumptions about pregnant 
women reflected and reinforced the sex roles of the separate spheres 
tradition,50 defining women’s family role in such a way as to make 
 
 45. Id. at 36. Ginsburg also observed that mandatory discharge puts a pregnant woman at a 
competitive disadvantage with men, “for it deprives her of opportunity for training and work 
experience during pregnancy and, in many cases, for a prolonged period thereafter.” Id. 
 46. Id. at 37; see also id. (“Loss of her job and accumulated benefits profoundly affect the 
choices open to her. No position awaits her after childbirth and she is apt to encounter 
discrimination in locating new employment, this time because she is a mother. If she defers 
return to the labor force for an extended period, her skills will have grown rusty and, upon 
attempted re-entry, she will face a further barrier: this time her age as well as her sex and 
limited work experience will count against her.” (footnote omitted)). 
 47. Id. at 55. 
 48. Id. at 48. 
 49. Id. at 50–51 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 52 (“The 
discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited 
notion that a woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home 
to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care.” (footnote omitted)). 
 50. See supra text accompanying note 49; cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 50–51 
(“[T]he regulation arbitrarily establishes a presumption of unfitness, distinguishing irrationally 
between pregnancy and far more debilitating physical conditions that do not occasion automatic 
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women dependents and second-class participants in core activities 
associated with citizenship. “[P]resumably well-meaning exaltation of 
woman’s unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied women 
equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities 
and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in 
society.”51 Increasingly, Americans were recognizing that laws 
imposing this traditional role on women violate women’s right to the 
equal protection of the laws.52 “In very recent years,” Ginsburg 
explained, “a new appreciation of women’s place has been generated 
in the United States. Activated by feminists of both sexes, legislatures 
and courts have begun to recognize and respond to the subordinate 
position of women in our society and the second-class status our 
institutions historically have imposed upon them.”53 
Although focusing most heavily on the equal protection 
argument, Ginsburg lodged two additional constitutional objections 
to the Air Force regulation. First, she urged that the regulation 
violated Captain Struck’s right to privacy.54 Relying on Griswold v. 
Connecticut55 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,56 she argued that the regulation 
“substantially infringes upon her right to sexual privacy, and her 
autonomy in deciding ‘whether to bear . . . a child.’”57 In response to 
the Air Force’s suggestion that it was aiming to encourage 
reproduction control, Ginsburg noted that the Air Force provided 
additional benefits to service members who become fathers in order 
 
discharge, and differentiating capriciously between a female and male who surrenders a child 
for adoption.”). 
 51. Id. at 38; see also id. at 38–45 (discussing, inter alia, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); 
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); and Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)). A similar sentence appears in her brief in Frontiero. See 
Brief of ACLU as Amicus Curiae at 34–35, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 
71-1694) (“[P]resumably well-meaning exaltation of woman’s unique role as wife and mother 
has, in effect, denied women equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities 
and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society.”). Ginsburg 
“[w]orked on Frontiero and Struck simultaneously.” Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. 
Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Neil S. Siegel (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file with authors). 
 52. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30–32. 
 53. Id. at 26–27 (footnote omitted). 
 54. Id. at 52 (“Imposition of this outmoded standard upon petitioner unconstitutionally 
encroaches upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life.”). 
 55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 56. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 57. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 54 (quoting Baird, 405 U.S. at 453). 
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to encourage them to continue serving.58 “The woman,” by stark 
contrast, “serves subject to ‘regulation’; her pursuit of an Air Force 
career requires that she decide not to bear a child.”59 
Ginsburg also asserted a free exercise claim, “stress[ing] that the 
challenged regulation operates with particularly brutal force against 
women of [Captain Struck’s Roman Catholic] faith.”60 This was 
because “[t]ermination of pregnancy prior to the birth of a living child 
was not an option [she] could choose.”61 In sum, “the regulation pitted 
her Air Force career against . . . her religious conscience.”62 
III.  THE LIGHT SHED BY STRUCK 
What does Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s merits brief in Struck suggest 
about her understanding of constitutional equality? Her clear-sighted 
insistence in the brief that “disadvantageous treatment because of 
pregnancy is indeed sex discrimination”63 indicates that, from the 
beginning, she had recognized that regulation of pregnancy could be 
discriminatory. She views some, but not all, regulation of pregnancy 
as discriminatory, just as she opposes most, but not all, forms of 
gender differentiation by the government as a violation of equal 
protection. Ginsburg neither mechanically rejects the potential 
relevance of differences between the sexes nor invariably embraces 
them. She is deeply concerned with disadvantageous disparate 
treatment, yet she contests the government’s efforts to impose sex-
 
 58. Id. at 55 (“[P]arenthood among servicemen is not deterred, indeed additional benefits 
are provided to encourage men who become fathers to remain in service.”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 56. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (footnote omitted). In the final section of the brief, Ginsburg demonstrated myriad 
problems with the government’s proffered rationales for the regulation: administrative 
convenience, contraception encouragement, hazards of the combat zone, and readiness and 
effectiveness of the fighting force. For example, she argued that administrative convenience was 
rejected in Reed as flatly insufficient to exclude women from opportunities, and that servicemen 
were in no way encouraged to use contraceptives. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 62–
65. She further noted that pregnancy triggered termination regardless of whether it occurred in 
a combat zone, and she suggested that the regulation would increase the potential hazards of the 
combat zone by making it less likely that women would quickly reveal pregnancies within a 
combat zone. Id. at 65–66 (citing Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Colo. 1972)). 
Finally, she noted that substantially more serious and lasting disabilities, such as drug addiction 
and alcoholism, did not trigger automatic discharge regardless of where they occurred. See id. at 
66–69. The rationale left standing was “blatant prejudice against women for a condition peculiar 
to their sex.” Id. at 69. 
 63. Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 1, at 206. 
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role restrictions primarily because she apprehends the harms that a 
particular, historically entrenched system of social roles has inflicted 
on both sexes—especially women. At bottom, the Struck brief 
suggests, Ginsburg contests legally enforced sex-role differentiation 
because she views the prevailing system of sex-role differentiation as 
perpetuating the subordinate status of women.64 Heading the list of 
arbitrary barriers that have plagued women seeking equal 
opportunity,” she thus insisted, “is disadvantaged treatment based on 
their unique childbearing function.”65 The harm is not simply the 
restriction imposed on one woman’s opportunities, but the 
“disadvantaged treatment” regularly inflicted on women because of 
their childbearing capacity. Ginsburg was concerned with a practice 
harming a group. 
In Struck, Ginsburg highlighted the forms of group disadvantage 
that discrimination can impose, and she repeatedly related concerns 
about stereotyping and subordination. For example, Ginsburg 
emphasized that laws enforcing traditional sex stereotypes inflict 
harm because they reinforce “the subordinate position of women in 
our society and the second-class status our institutions historically 
have imposed upon them.”66 The Struck brief challenged the 
government’s discriminatory discharge primarily because the 
government was enforcing sex roles that reinforced the inferior social 
status of a historically marginalized group.67 This antisubordination 
perspective would shape Ginsburg’s approach to equal protection on 
 
 64. A wide range of scholars have discussed the antisubordination understanding of equal 
protection. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 38 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Groups 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 151 (1976); Athena D. Mutua, The 
Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 
DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2006) (“Critical Race Theory’s . . . stance is one of 
‘antisubordination.’”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–76 (2004); see also 
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (arguing “that the scope of the 
[antisubordination and aniticlassification] principles overlap, [and] that their application shifts 
over time in response to social contestation and social struggle”); Jill Elaine Hasday, The 
Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public 
Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 769–79 (2002) (discussing different accounts of the 
antisubordination principle). 
 65. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 34. 
 66. Id. at 27; see also text accompanying notes 13, 51. 
 67. See Siegel, supra note 64, at 1472–73 (defining “the antisubordination principle” as “the 
conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social 
status of historically oppressed groups”). 
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the Court as well. For example, in her majority opinion in United 
States v. Virginia, she would distinguish sharply between efforts to 
exclude women from institutions or opportunities in American 
society, and efforts to include them by taking relevant differences 
(such as pregnancy) into account.68 
More specifically, the Struck brief exemplifies that 
antisubordination values (1) define Ginsburg’s understanding of what 
constitutional equality is, and thus guide her determination of when 
and how equality values are implicated; (2) identify the perspective 
from which this equality determination should be made; and (3) 
connect her constitutional commitments to both equality and liberty. 
This Part considers each dimension of her thinking in turn. 
First, Ginsburg does not regard an antisubordination approach as 
an alternative to equality analysis. Rather, she regards 
antisubordination as equality—that is, as equal standing and respect. 
She insists that sex discrimination exists even when a regulation is 
purportedly based on physical differences between the sexes, or 
“when its impact concentrates on a portion of the protected class, for 
example, married women, mothers, or pregnant women.”69 She so 
 
 68. VMI offers the governing statement of the intermediate scrutiny standard and explains 
the intermediate scrutiny framework as vindicating antisubordination values. Writing for the 
Court, Justice Ginsburg explains that “‘[i]nherent differences’ between men and women, we 
have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members 
of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” United States v. 
Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). “Sex classifications,” she instructs, “may be used to 
compensate women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’” id. (quoting 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam)), “to ‘promot[e] equal employment 
opportunity,’” id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)), 
and “to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people,” id. at 
533–34. But, she underscores, “such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create 
or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.” Id. at 534 (citing Goesaert 
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)). Justice Ginsburg brings this same antisubordination 
analytic to racial equality cases. Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“The Constitution instructs all who act for the government that they may not ‘deny 
to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.’ In implementing this equality instruction, as 
I see it, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and 
inclusion. Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly 
ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its 
aftereffects have been extirpated.” (citations omitted)). 
  The same antisubordination perspective guided Ginsburg’s argument in Struck, even 
when she was seeking for her client the same treatment as nonpregnant service members who 
were temporarily disabled or about to become a parent. The animating concern Ginsburg 
expressed in Struck and subsequently on the bench was a concern with securing equal status, 
and not a formalist concern with same treatment. 
 69. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 15. 
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insists because her perspective deems constitutionally pertinent not 
only the existence of a formal sex classification or intentional 
discrimination but also the effects and social meanings of government 
regulation of women. These concerns define an antisubordination 
understanding of equality,70 which guides determination of when and 
how equality values are implicated. As illustrated by Struck, such 
guidance is critical in sex discrimination cases to negotiate when 
differentiation implicates equality. In contrast to pregnancy 
discrimination, Ginsburg likely did not devote her litigation efforts to 
opposing, for example, sex-segregated bathrooms because they do not 
implicate basic questions about the equal citizenship stature of 
women.71 
Second, Ginsburg’s Struck brief makes plain that she determines 
whether equality values are implicated primarily from the standpoint 
of members of historically excluded groups, and not principally from 
the perspective of members of included groups—which was the 
approach taken by, among others, the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson72 
and Bradwell v. Illinois.73 According to the district court in Struck, 
 
 70. For a classic focus on the purposes, effects, and social meanings of a practice as 
determinative under equal protection analysis, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). Professor Black wrote: “Can a system which, in 
all that can be measured, has practiced the grossest inequality, actually have been ‘equal’ in 
intent, in total social meaning and impact? ‘Thy speech maketh thee manifest . . .’; segregation, 
in all visible things, speaks only haltingly any dialect but that of inequality.” Id. at 426. 
 71. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Fear of the Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 7, 1975, at A21 (“Separate places to disrobe, sleep, perform personal bodily 
functions are permitted, in some situations required, by regard for individual privacy.”); cf. 
VMI, 518 U.S. at 550 n.19 (“Admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations 
necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements, and 
to adjust aspects of the physical training programs. Experience shows such adjustments are 
manageable.” (citations omitted)). 
 72. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying 
fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of 
the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason 
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.”), with Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union, Address at the National Constitution 
Center (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/hisownwords 
(“[T]he path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African-American 
community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination—
and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past—are real and must be 
addressed.”). 
 73. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). The Court upheld the exclusion of 
women from the practice of law. Id. at 139. In a concurring opinion, Justice Bradley wrote that 
“[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife 
and mother. This is the law of the Creator.” Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). “Although the 
method of communication between the Creator and the jurist is never disclosed,” Ginsburg 
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“[s]omebody said that [women are a little more difficult when they 
are pregnant than when they are not], that there is some change in 
their personality, and their capabilities. It could well be that the Air 
Force felt that when they formulated their policy and rules . . . .”74 By 
stark contrast, Ginsburg noted the many female doctors and nurses in 
obstetrics and other medical fields who work right up to the day of 
delivery,75 and she continually framed the case for the Court from 
Captain Struck’s point of view. To reiterate, she drew from the 
“petitioner’s experience” to substantiate her assertion that “many 
women are capable of working effectively during pregnancy and 
require only a brief period of absence immediately before and after 
childbirth.”76 She underscored the devastating impact of the Air Force 
regulation on the career prospects of a military woman and the lack 
of any justification for the regulation that did not sound most 
plausibly in traditional stereotypes about how women are “supposed” 
to respond to a pregnancy.77 
 
wrote in her Struck brief, “‘divine ordinance’ has been a dominant theme in decisions justifying 
laws establishing sex-based classifications.” Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 39. 
 74. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35 n.29 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Struck v. Sec’y of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (1971) (No. 71-
1150) (statement of William N. Goodwin, J.)). 
 75. Id. at 35 & n.29. 
 76. Id. at 35. 
 77. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg viewed a recent sex discrimination case from the 
perspective of the victim: 
The Court’s insistence on immediate contest overlooks common characteristics of pay 
discrimination. Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small 
increments; cause to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time. 
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from the employee’s view. 
Employers may keep under wraps the pay differentials maintained among 
supervisors, no less the reasons for those differentials. Small initial discrepancies may 
not be seen as meet for a federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to 
succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to making waves. 
Pay disparities are thus significantly different from adverse actions “such as 
termination, failure to promote . . . or refusal to hire,” all involving fully 
communicated discrete acts, “easy to identify” as discriminatory. It is only when the 
disparity becomes apparent and sizable, e.g., through future raises calculated as a 
percentage of current salaries, that an employee in Ledbetter’s situation is likely to 
comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial readiness to give her 
employer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her from later challenging the 
then current and continuing payment of a wage depressed on account of her sex. 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). Congress subsequently endorsed the perspective that Ginsburg 
adopted in dissent. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was the first bill that President 
Obama signed into law. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html. 
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Third, although Ginsburg stressed the equality dimension of 
discharge-for-pregnancy regulations in her Struck brief,78 she also 
asserted a substantive due process claim and advanced it in a way that 
reveals the link between her views on constitutional equality and 
constitutional liberty.79 (At the time of Roe, feminists understood 
Struck as both an equality and a liberty case—just as they understood 
Roe.80) In making the due process argument, Ginsburg continued to 
speak in part in terms of “discrimination” and social subordination.81 
This is not because she was conceptually confused, but because she 
registered that laws intervening in major life decisions and enforcing 
status roles may simultaneously implicate both equality and liberty—
equal protection and due process. Restricting women’s liberty may be 
a means to the end of communicating inequality, and discriminating 
against women may diminish their opportunities to fashion fulfilling 
lives.82 For Ginsburg, it seems less important to disentangle these two 
clusters of constitutional commitments than it is to emphasize the 
ways in which they are intertwined.83 
 
 78. See Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 1, at 206 (“The main emphasis was on her equality 
as a woman, vis-a-vis a man who was equally responsible for the conception . . . .”); id. (“I did 
think about it, first and foremost, as differential treatment of the woman, based on her sex.”). 
 79. See id. at 205 (“[I]t has never in my mind been an either/or choice, never one rather 
than the other; it has been both.”); id. at 206 (“At no time did I regard it as an either/or, one 
pocket or the other issue.”). 
 80. See Goodman et al., supra note 34, at 35 (discussing reproductive freedom as the right 
to decide whether to have or not to have children without state interference, and describing 
Struck as a case about “coercion”). For an account of the feminist reproductive rights claims of 
the era, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their 
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007). “In these early 
briefs, liberty talk and equality talk were entangled as emanations of different constitutional 
clauses.” Id. at 823. 
 81. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 52 (“The discriminatory treatment 
required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited notion that a woman who 
becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home to await childbirth and 
thereafter devote herself to child care. Imposition of this outmoded standard upon petitioner 
unconstitutionally encroaches upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 82. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1738–45, 1763–66 (2008) (developing this insight); id. at 
1744–45 (“Concern that restrictions on women’s liberty can communicate meanings about 
women’s social standing lies at the heart of the sex discrimination cases, especially those cases 
invalidating laws that deny women autonomy to make decisions about their family roles.”). 
 83. Justice Ginsburg has recently reemphasized the close link between constitutional 
equality and constitutional liberty in the area of reproductive rights. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Her opinion in Gonzales v. 
Carhart cites equal protection sex discrimination cases as support for the abortion right. See id. 
at 1649. 
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Some feminists, however, have criticized Justice Ginsburg for 
advocating a sex-blind formal equality in sex discrimination cases; 
they depict her as only and overly concerned with arbitrary sex-based 
differentiation84—in substantial part because she championed the 
causes of male plaintiffs in certain such cases.85 Much of this criticism 
occurred in an era of backlash, when an increasingly conservative 
Court was employing a formalist conception of classification to make 
equal protection law blind to problems of disparate impact and 
hostile to affirmative action, in sex as well as race cases.86 In such an 
 
 84. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 17, at 216, 231 (“Fourteen of the [nineteen] cases decided 
since Craig were brought by men. Lower court cases exhibit a similar pattern. The women’s 
won-lost record is better than the men’s; moreover, victories by men do not necessarily harm 
women and may benefit them. But so far men have been the primary beneficiaries of the new 
sexual equality doctrine. Ruth Bader Ginsburg has given no indication that this outcome 
troubles her. She continues to regard sex equality not as requiring the elimination of male 
supremacy, but as a problem of discrimination, of basing decisions on a person’s sex.” (footnote 
omitted)); David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s World, 
2 L. & INEQUALITY 33, 55 (1984) (“Ginsburg chose to litigate issues that she could frame as 
hurting both men and women, rather than issues, like pregnancy discrimination, where the harm 
fell on women alone. She sought to deny women’s ‘difference;’ this strategy both limited her 
range and increased her chances for success. Ginsburg’s classic argument was to insist that 
women were like men. She sought to show that women were similarly situated, but that society 
had treated them differently because of stereotypical ‘old notions’ and ‘archaic assumptions’ 
about sex roles. . . . Nevertheless, Ginsburg’s assimilationist method could not address the entire 
range of women’s rights issues. Assimilation is most obviously an insufficient response to issues 
of reproductive freedom. In this area, women are biologically different, and therefore women 
must be treated differently to be treated equally.”). Ginsburg has herself summarized much of 
the criticism. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist 
Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 17 (“[Feminist legal scholars] have 
portrayed the 1970s litigation as assimilationist in outlook, insistent on formal equality, opening 
doors only to comfortably situated women willing to accept men’s rules and be treated like men, 
even a misguided effort that harmed more women than it helped.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional an Oklahoma 
law that allowed women to buy 3.2 percent beer at age eighteen but did not allow men to buy 
such beer until age twenty-one); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (declaring 
unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that allowed a woman whose husband 
died to receive benefits based on his earnings but did not allow a man whose wife died to 
receive benefits based on her earnings); Moritz v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466 
(10th Cir. 1972) (declaring unconstitutional a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that 
denied a deduction for dependent-care expenses to a man who never married while granting the 
deduction to women, widowers, divorcés, and husbands in certain circumstances). Wiesenfeld in 
particular was “[a] case near and dear to my heart.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, quoted in AMY 
LEIGH CAMPBELL, RAISING THE BAR: RUTH BADER GINSBURG AND THE ACLU WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS PROJECT 93 (2004). This is perhaps because a man was ready, willing, and able to raise 
his child in a society that deemed him perverse for wanting to do what had long been deemed 
“women’s work.” 
 86. For an account of these developments in race discrimination law, see generally Fiss, 
supra note 64; Siegel, supra note 64, at 1535–38. One of the authors has explored the 
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era, it was possible to (mis)construe Ginsburg’s selection of male sex 
discrimination plaintiffs as of a piece with the formalist reasoning of 
the Burger Court. 
As the Struck brief shows, however, it was not. Ginsburg’s 
selection of a pregnant plaintiff to advance the equal protection 
claims of women demonstrates that she was no formalist. In Struck 
itself, Ginsburg explained that she was challenging laws that enforce 
traditional sex-role stereotypes because such laws lead to the 
subordination of women: “presumably well-meaning exaltation of 
woman’s unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied women 
equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities 
and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in 
society.”87 Captain Struck “was presumed unfit for service under a 
regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits into the 
stereotyped vision . . . of the ‘correct’ female response to 
pregnancy.”88 Ginsburg’s message was clear: sex-role stereotypes of 
the separate spheres tradition subordinate women by denying them 
an equal chance to make their own meaning of their lives. 
In an important forthcoming article, Cary Franklin has 
reconstructed the social theory on which Ginsburg’s early litigation 
strategy was premised.89 As Franklin shows, Ginsburg understood that 
the stereotypes contested by the male plaintiffs she represented were 
part of a dyadic system of gender roles that defined men as 
breadwinners and women as dependent caregivers in ways that 
subordinated women.90 Ginsburg’s antistereotyping approach was not 
 
implications in sex discrimination law. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as 
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2188–95 (1996) (showing how the Court’s rejection 
of disparate impact claims in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Personnel 
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), shielded from equal protection scrutiny “facially 
neutral” practices (such as domestic violence policies) that have long played a role in 
subordinating women). 
 87. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 38; see also id. at 38–45 (discussing, inter alia, 
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 
208 U.S. 412 (1908); and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)). 
 88. Id. at 50–51 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination 
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2010) (manuscript on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 90. See id. at 3–4. Franklin explains that “Ginsburg derived the anti-stereotyping principle 
in part from . . . the law and politics of Sweden, which began in the early 1960s to wage an 
ambitious, decades-long campaign against sex-role enforcement.” Id. at 4. Specifically, the 
Swedish anti-stereotyping ideals that would powerfully impact Professor Ginsburg went far 
beyond insisting on formal equality between the sexes. “Proponents of jämställdhet,” as this 
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simply hostile to sex classification or sex differentiation; she opposed 
traditional sex stereotypes insofar as they were part of a system of 
social roles and understandings that anchored women’s inequality. 
Ginsburg’s effort to defend a pregnant member of the Air Force 
is of a piece with her interest in bringing cases on behalf of caregiving 
men. Neither reflects a formal view of equality. Instead, Ginsburg 
challenged laws enforcing traditional sex stereotypes because she 
understood them as part of a larger set of social arrangements that 
ultimately subordinated women. 
Ginsburg’s articulation of an antisubordination perspective in 
Struck is even more remarkable when the brief is situated in historical 
context. Today, antisubordination arguments tend to be associated 
with Owen Fiss’s 1976 expression of antisubordination themes in 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause91 and Catherine 
MacKinnon’s 1979 use of an antisubordination analytic in Sexual 
Harassment of Working Women.92 The Struck brief evidences 
Ginsburg speaking in an antisubordination register in 1972, carrying 
into the sex equality context concerns about status inequality 
expressed in debates over Brown v. Board of Education.93 One cannot 
help but be struck (so to speak) by the timing of this brief. Although 
Ginsburg was by no means the only legal feminist at the time to 
conceive sex equality from an antisubordination perspective, she did 
play an early and leading role in showing how concerns about social 
 
Swedish theory of gender equality was known, “believed sex classifications were often necessary 
in order to break down traditional conceptions of men and women’s roles; their aim was not to 
eliminate formal sex classifications but to liberate both sexes from prescriptive sex stereotypes.” 
Id. at 17. According to Franklin, it was for this reason, and not because of strategic 
considerations or a commitment to formal equality, that Professor Ginsburg sought out male 
plaintiffs in several of the cases that she litigated. For citations to some of these cases, see supra 
note 85. 
 91. Fiss, supra note 64, at 157 (proposing to substitute for the equal treatment principle a 
group-disadvantaging principle premised on a theory of “status-harm” that would inquire 
whether a challenged practice would “impair or threaten or aggravate the status or position of 
the group”). 
 92. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE 
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979) (proposing that courts determining whether a practice 
discriminates on the basis of sex inquire “whether the policy or practice in question integrally 
contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or deprived position because of gender status”); 
see also supra note 64 (citing scholarship on antisubordination). 
 93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For discussions of debates about the 
meaning of Brown, see Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 231–37 (2008); Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: 
Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 830–33, 841–43 
(2006); Siegel, supra note 64, at 1532–44. 
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subordination illuminate the problem of sex discrimination. Her 
prescience has not been sufficiently recognized. 
The timing of Ginsburg’s Struck brief is noteworthy for another 
reason. Ginsburg persuasively urged the Court to view pregnancy 
discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, and sex discrimination 
as inextricably intertwined with women’s autonomy to decide 
whether to bear children, at a time when the entire landscape of 
modern sex discrimination law and substantive due process law had 
yet to be worked out. Ginsburg and the women’s movement talked 
about pregnancy discrimination in a way that ties together pregnancy 
discrimination and women’s equality, and women’s equality and 
reproductive freedom,94 before the Court split them apart in cases 
such as Roe v. Wade, Frontiero v. Richardson, and Geduldig v. Aiello. 
The Court made some fateful choices in those cases: to focus its sex 
equality jurisprudence on cases other than pregnancy, and so to 
develop its sex equality jurisprudence in isolation from its abortion 
jurisprudence.95 It is only by apprehending where the law was and 
where it was about to go when Struck was litigated that one can fully 
appreciate the momentousness, the audacity, and the profundity of 
this brief—as well as the implications of its erasure. In 1976, the Court 
embraced the intermediate scrutiny standard for sex discrimination 
claims in a case involving men who sought to purchase 3.2 percent 
beer.96 How would our understanding of sex discrimination and 
substantive due process law differ had the Court recognized the equal 
protection claim of a pregnant service woman who challenged the 
government’s requirement that she have an abortion or lose her 
position in the military? 
IV.  BACK TO THE FUTURE 
This Essay has not come close to recovering all of the virtues of 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s merits brief in Struck v. Secretary of Defense. 
Nor has it identified all of the interesting questions and ironies that it 
 
 94. See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL, ON THE ROAD TO ROE V. WADE: HOW 
AMERICANS TALKED ABOUT ABORTION IN THE YEARS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S 
LANDMARK RULING (forthcoming 2010) (reproducing feminist arguments for abortion rights 
from 1969–73 that invoke both privacy and equality and analyze the regulation of abortion as 
part of the regulation of motherhood). 
 95. For a discussion of these two points, see infra Part IV. 
 96. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
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implicates.97 The brief is a veritable treasure trove of accurate 
predictions, subtle insights, and effective advocacy. Among other 
things, it mentions the possibility of intermediate scrutiny for sex 
classifications,98 leaves the door open for “compensatory treatment” 
of women “in special situations,”99 underscores the men who have 
adopted Ginsburg’s position,100 gently gestures in the direction of the 
link between sex discrimination and burdensome regulations of 
abortion,101 and emphasizes themes of sexual intimacy and privacy,102 
which decades later would find expression in the Court’s dawning 
recognition of the equal citizenship stature of homosexuals.103 
Throughout the brief, Ginsburg’s distinct and powerful voice is 
present. For legal academics who care about the development of 
Justice Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination, the brief is essential 
reading. 
Most significantly, however, the brief deserves a wide readership 
because of what it instructs about the present. It may soon be time to 
reimagine what is possible in this corner of constitutional law. In 
1972, Professor Ginsburg made a compelling argument that 
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination because of the social 
understandings about women it reflects and the profound limitations 
on their lives it enforces. Although the Court eventually accepted 
 
 97. Particularly in light of how cultural battle lines have been drawn in the twenty-first 
century, it is illuminating to see Justice Ginsburg’s voice deployed in the service of both the 
equal citizenship stature of women and one particular woman’s religiously based opposition to 
procuring an abortion. From the vantage point of the present, it may be ironic that Ginsburg’s 
views on sex discrimination and abortion first developed in this setting. But it serves as an 
instructive reminder that Americans today agree about more than they often realize. 
 98. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 26 (“In addition to the two commonly 
differentiated review standards, some of the decisions of this Court suggest an intermediate 
standard.”). 
 99. Id. at 29 n.24 (“It is not urged here that extensive compensatory treatment is needed to 
redress past discrimination against women. [A Second Circuit decision], however, indicates that 
in special situations compensatory treatment may be appropriate.” (referencing Gruenwald v. 
Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“In 1971, two legal scholars—both of them male—examined the 
record of the judiciary in sex discrimination cases; they concluded that the performance of 
American judges in this area ‘can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to 
abominable.’”). 
 101. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 54 n.55 (“Griswold alone, or in conjunction 
with Baird, has been cited in numerous lower court decisions holding that women have a right 
to determine for themselves, free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, whether or not to 
bear children.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970))). 
 102. See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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much of her general vision of sex equality, it was slow to recognize 
discrimination against pregnant women as a paradigmatic form of sex 
discrimination. In 1974, the Court in Geduldig acknowledged that 
discrimination against pregnant women might be animated by 
invidious judgments about women, but found exclusion of pregnancy 
benefits from otherwise comprehensive disability insurance to be a 
rational method of saving taxpayer monies.104 The Court did, 
however, yield to the instruction of Congress that discrimination 
against pregnant women can violate federal employment 
discrimination law, and began to enforce the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Amendment (PDA) (1978) to Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.105 After three decades of PDA litigation, Americans 
are more receptive to the claim that discrimination against pregnant 
women is sex discrimination, and they have come to view it as a claim 
of fundamental—even constitutional—magnitude.106 With these 
 
 104. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974). The Gedulgig decision reasoned: 
While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow that every 
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those 
considered in [Reed and Frontiero]. Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable 
physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions 
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination 
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to 
include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any 
reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition. 
Id. at 496 n.20 (emphasis added). This much quoted passage from Geduldig is often read as 
denying that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. In fact, the passage in question 
reasons that pregnancy discrimination is not always sex discriminatory or invidious, but 
sometimes may be. As shown in this Part, in the years since its decision in Geduldig, the Court 
has come to recognize that gender bias in the regulation of pregnancy is more prevalent than 
perhaps it first believed. 
 105. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2042 n.309 
(2003). 
 106. Consider, for example, the likely political prospects of an attempt to repeal the PDA, 
which responded to Geduldig and Gilbert. Gilbert followed Geduldig’s reasoning and held that a 
disability benefit plan excluding disabilities related to pregnancy was not sex-based 
discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). For a discussion of the PDA’s role in shaping popular and 
judicial understandings of sex discrimination, see Reva B. Siegel, “You’ve Come a Long Way, 
Baby”: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1871, 1897–98 (2006). 
  The Court recently discussed this case law and Congress’s responses to it in AT&T 
Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009). There, the Court held that an employer does not 
necessarily violate the PDA when it pays pension benefits based in part on an accrual rule, 
applied only prior to the PDA’s enactment, that gave less retirement credit for pregnancy leave 
than for medical leave generally. Id. at 1966. Only Justice Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg’s 
passionate dissent, in which she described Gilbert as wrong—indeed, “astonishing,” 
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changes, the Court has begun to move closer to Ginsburg’s 
understanding of sex discrimination without wholeheartedly 
embracing her point of view.107 
For example, it was Chief Justice Rehnquist—Rehnquist!—who 
wrote the majority opinion in Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs.108 Hibbs upheld the leave provision of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)109 as a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
combat unconstitutional sex discrimination.110 Remarkably, the Hibbs 
Court expressly registered the sometimes deep divide between formal 
equality and substantive equality: in an America in which women are 
still required to serve as the principal caregivers in their families, 
 
“egregious[],” and “aberrational”—the day it was decided. Id. at 1977, 1979 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). All of the other Justices allowed AT&T to perpetuate pay differentials in the post-
PDA period that were attributable to pregnancy discrimination that occurred in the pre-PDA 
period. 
  But if seven Justices allowed AT&T to perpetuate pay differentials attributable to pre-
PDA discrimination, none of them said anything in defense of Geduldig and Gilbert’s reasoning. 
In essence, the majority reasoned that the employer’s discrimination was reasonable when it 
occurred, even if it was no longer an acceptable way to treat women. Ginsburg’s 
characterization of Gilbert provoked no defense of the decision from any other Justice. This is in 
stark contrast to what commonly occurs when individual Justices speak their minds forcefully in 
controversial areas of law. (Consider, for instance, Justice Scalia’s response to Justice Stevens 
regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).) 
Both the narrow holding and the loud silences in Hulteen suggest little enthusiasm on the early 
Roberts Court for defending the view of the relation between pregnancy discrimination and sex 
discrimination espoused in Geduldig and Gilbert. 
 107. For a discussion of these developments from the perspective of legal doctrine, see Neil 
S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping, from Struck to Carhart, 70 
OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming November 2009) (symposium essay honoring the jurisprudence of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
 108. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). Commentators have noted 
the magnitude of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s shift in position from his early days on the Court to 
VMI, see United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 558–66 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment), and then to Hibbs. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Introduction: 
Learning to Listen to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. CITY L. REV. 213, 218–19 (2004); Deborah 
Jones Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of Opportunity and 
Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 47 (2004); Siegel, supra note 106, at 1871–98. The evolution of 
the late Chief Justice’s views on sex discrimination is as striking as the development of his 
relationship with Justice Ginsburg is endearing. During the year one of the authors spent in her 
chambers, she often expressed her devotion to him by calling him “the Chief” or “my Chief.” 
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of 
Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 267–
70 (1997) (discussing, inter alia, the change in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s views on sex 
discrimination and referring to him as “my now Chief”). 
 109. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2006). 
 110. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 740. 
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mere formal equality in the administration of family leave benefits—
for example, allowing no leave time for any employees—would 
“exclude far more women than men from the workplace”111 and 
therefore would not effectively “combat the stereotypes about the 
roles of male and female employees that Congress sought to 
eliminate” in passing the FMLA.112 
Hibbs reflects the understanding that new mothers and pregnant 
women face intense stereotyping in the workplace. Hibbs observes 
that “denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has 
[long] been traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that 
women are mothers first, and workers second.”113 “This prevailing 
ideology about women’s roles,” the Court agreed with Congress, has 
“justified discrimination against women when they are mothers or 
mothers-to-be.”114 In these and other passages, Hibbs clearly indicates 
that regulation of pregnant women can amount to constitutionally 
actionable sex discrimination; for example, the Court suggests that 
laws giving benefits to pregnant employees that are premised on 
traditional sex-role stereotypes violate equal protection.115 The Hibbs 
Court had no occasion to reconcile the opinion’s reasoning with 
Geduldig,116 but the reasoning in Hibbs parallels Ginsburg’s reasoning 
in Struck, not the Burger Court’s reasoning in Geduldig.117 Although 
Geduldig is commonly read as holding that discrimination against 
pregnant women can never be sex discrimination, after Hibbs it is 
time to read Geduldig more precisely, as holding that discrimination 
 
 111. Id. at 738. 
 112. Id. at 734. The implications of such reasoning for the scope of congressional power 
under Section 5 are broad indeed. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 89, at 47–50 (persuasively 
defending the constitutionality of legislation (1) expanding the FMLA’s coverage to small and 
midsize employers and to provide covered employees with paid leave; (2) requiring paid sick 
leave; (3) providing affordable childcare; and (4) addressing sex segregation in the American 
labor market). 
 113. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: J. Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the 
H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1986) (statement of Women’s Legal 
Defense Fund)). 
 114. Id. (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, supra note 113, at 100). 
 115. See id. at 731 & n.5. 
 116. For further discussion of Geduldig, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 117. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). For a discussion of the Court’s 
reasoning in Hibbs, see generally Siegel, supra note 106, at 1889–91. 
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against pregnant woman is not always sex discrimination—but 
sometimes can be.118 
In addition to arguing that pregnancy discrimination is sex 
discrimination, Ginsburg also intimated on behalf of Captain Struck 
in 1972 that women’s equality and women’s reproductive freedom are 
inextricably linked. She noted the many lower courts, including the 
federal district court in Roe, that had read the Court’s contraception 
decisions as “holding that women have a right to determine for 
themselves, free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, whether 
or not to bear children.”119 Although Roe incompletely grasped this 
link and discussed the abortion right from the perspective of a 
woman’s physician,120 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey121 came closer to registering the true stakes. 
The plurality opinion in Casey stressed the liberty of the pregnant 
 
 118. For further elaboration of this reading of Geduldig, see generally Siegel & Siegel, supra 
note 107. Because the PDA is firmly entrenched, it may be unclear what would be the practical 
implications in the pregnancy context of recognizing pregnancy discrimination as 
unconstitutional sex discrimination. There might be some practical consequences in light of 
potential Eleventh Amendment objections to enforcing the PDA in certain settings. Yet a Court 
that takes Hibbs seriously would be unlikely to impose any Section 5 impediment to enforcing 
the PDA against the states. And a Court that does not take Hibbs seriously would be unlikely to 
recognize pregnancy discrimination as unconstitutional sex discrimination. Regardless, broader 
doctrinal implications would follow from recognizing that physical differences between the 
sexes are the beginning, not the end, of the constitutional conversation about women’s equality. 
For example, Cary Franklin suggests that, after VMI and Hibbs, it no longer seems open to the 
federal government to assert that physical differences between the sexes justify excluding 
women from selective service registration, eligibility for the draft, and various combat positions. 
See Franklin, supra note 89, at 51–53. Nor, she argues, does it seem permissible for the 
government to support programs of single-sex education that reinforce traditional sex-role 
stereotypes. See id. at 46–47. Nor, she astutely notes, are certain rationales for prohibiting gay 
marriage reconcilable with an anti-stereotyping conception of constitutional equality. See id. at 
57–65. 
 119. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 54 n.55; see also text accompanying note 101. 
For subsequent discussions, see generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the 
Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy 
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985). 
 120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this 
‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, 
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be 
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of 
interference by the State.”); id. at 164 (“For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first 
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the 
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”). 
 121. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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woman,122 and a majority of Justices began to articulate the sex 
equality implications of intrusive restrictions on abortion.123 To be 
sure, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart124 may have taken a step in a 
very different direction.125 But four Justices adopted Justice 
Ginsburg’s apprehension that “legal challenges to undue restrictions 
on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized 
notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to 
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship 
stature.”126 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion makes 
conceptual sense only if one presupposes the continued existence of 
the abortion right,127 and Kennedy has long recognized the link 
 
 122. Id. at 876 (plurality opinion) (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the 
appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally 
protected liberty.”). 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 852 (“Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, 
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been 
in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large 
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”); id. at 856 
(“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has 
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”); id. at 897 (stating that the 
views expressed in Bradwell and Hoyt “of course, are no longer consistent with our 
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution”). 
 124. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 125. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 
1014–30 (2008). 
 126. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting) (citing Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992), and Sylvia Law, 
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1002–28 (1984)); see also, e.g., 
Siegel, supra note 80, at 837–38 (situating Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Carhart in a survey of 
sex equality arguments for reproductive rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, Ginsburg’s Dissent 
May Yet Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A31 (noting that in Carhart, Justice Ginsburg 
“attempted to re-conceive the foundations of the abortion right, basing it on well-established 
constitutional principles of equality”). 
 127. Carhart exemplifies the often real but notoriously blurry distinction between 
constitutional politics and constitutional law. On the one hand, opponents of abortion have used 
the issue of so-called partial-birth abortion to undermine the abortion right in general, see 
Siegel, supra note 82, at 1707–09, and the Carhart Court effectively overruled precedent in order 
to uphold a federal ban on the procedure, see Siegel, supra note 125, at 1020–21. On the other 
hand, the Court reasoned that the ban could survive a facial challenge because the procedure 
was sufficiently distinct from abortion in general and did not impose an undue burden on the 
right to abortion. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1627. For one attempt to understand the ragged 
relationship between constitutional politics and constitutional law, see generally Robert C. Post 
& Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, 
and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473 (2007). One of the authors has 
explored this relationship in more depth. See generally Siegel, supra note 125 (conceiving law as 
an institution that must account for the conditions of its own legitimation); Neil S. Siegel, 
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007) (identifying 
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between human dignity as equality and human dignity as liberty, 
including in the context of abortion.128 
In short, the future has yet to be determined. For reasons 
intellectual, historical, and jurisprudential, Professor Ginsburg’s 
skillful advocacy on behalf of Captain Susan Struck warrants the 
careful inspection that it has long been denied. The Struck brief shows 
that in 1972 Ruth Bader Ginsburg viewed laws imposing traditional 
sex stereotypical roles on pregnant women as a core case of sex 
discrimination; she argued that such laws violated equal protection 
because they denied individual women equal opportunity and 
imposed on women as a group a dependent, subordinate status in 
American society. Haltingly but discernibly, the country is coming to 
adopt her perspective as its own. 
 
ways in which judges, especially Justices, act not as “umpires” but as engaged participants in the 
constitutional culture of the nation). 
 128. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy’s relevant views, see generally Siegel, supra note 
82. 
